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Abstract 
 
This article addresses the impact of the current economic downturn on innovation across Europe. 
Using micro and macro data we investigate to what extent some characteristics of a country affect 
the reaction of its firms in terms of innovation investment. It emerges that the effects of the 
economic downturn in terms of firms’ innovation investment are not the same across European 
countries. The competences and quality of the human resources, the specialization in the hi-
technology sector together with the depth of the financial system seem to be the structural factors 
which are able to offset the effect of the economic downturn on innovation investments of firms 
across Europe. Finally, some considerations about policies during the crisis are discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Strangely enough, economists of innovation are not participating in the debate about the causes and 
impact of the ongoing global crisis (for an exception, see Perez, 2009a). This is probably due to a 
general belief that innovation has little to do with economic crisis. However, since Schumpeter we 
know that innovation is a fundamental source of economic fluctuations. Following his contribution 
on business cycles (Schumpeter, 1939), the relationship between innovation and the dynamics of 
economic development has been largely addressed in the “long waves” literature. This debate 
experienced a passionate revival during and after the 1970s recession (Van Duijn, 1983; Freeman, 
1984; Tylecote, 1992; Perez, 2002). When dealing with the relationship between innovation and 
business cycles, two extreme hypotheses are at stake: according to the first, innovation is cyclical 
and therefore firms tend to reduce their innovation efforts during the downswing of the economy, 
while according to the second it is instead counter-cyclical and claims that recessions are a fertile 
environment for firms to innovate.  
 
In a controversial book, Mensch (1979) claimed that radical innovations are more likely to cluster 
during periods of depressions. In opposition to this there were those who answered that what 
matters for the economy is not so much the first introduction of an innovation, but the process of 
adoption and diffusion, which are more likely to take place during the growing phases of the 
business cycles (Freeman et al., 1982). Although in this paper we do not take a long-term 
perspective, and we rather focus on the current economic downturn in comparison to the three years 
before the crisis burst out, the discussion on the impact of long term economic fluctuations in 
innovation is still pertinent for our argument. Our aim is to assess the effects of the current global 
turmoil on firms’ investment in innovation across European countries and to provide some 
explanations accounting for cross-countries differences. We aim to answer the following questions: 
i. to what extent firms’ behaviour about innovation investment is influenced by the current financial 
shock? ii. do significant cross-country differences emerge in terms of firms’ innovation behaviour? 
iii. which factors can explain the presence of cross-country differences? 
 
In order to explain the different innovative behaviours of the firms (if any) across countries, two 
different categories of explanation are here addressed: i. some structural characteristics of the 
National System of Innovation (NSI), and ii. the magnitude of the macroeconomic shock in terms of 
the drop in domestic demand and export. In a nutshell, we are seeking to explain firm behaviour in 
response to the crisis by using characteristics of each country. The NSI literature has already widely 
shown the prominence of some country-specific factors in shaping the patterns of innovation of 
firms (Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993; Malerba and Orsenigo, 1999). In this article we aim to build 
on these findings by shedding some light on the role of country-specific characteristics as 
determinants of firms’ innovation behaviour in cases of adverse events such as a major financial 
crisis. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section we put forward the theoretical background of 
the empirical analysis. Section three presents the data sources and the methodology. Section four 
explores the impact of the recession on firms’ innovation investments in a descriptive fashion. 
Section five presents the results of the econometric analysis addressing the differences of the firms’ 
innovation behaviours across the different countries. Section six discusses the results, suggests 
some policy implications, and points out the limitation of the analysis. Finally, the last section 
concludes.   
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2. Investments, (ational System of Innovation, demand and the business cycle 
 
2.1. Investment and innovation over the business cycle 
 
Both Keynes and Schumpeter agreed that decisions to invest play a crucial role in economic 
fluctuations. But while Keynes and his followers are mostly concerned with investment as the most 
dynamic and volatile component of aggregate demand, Schumpeter and his followers argue that the 
nature of investment is equally important in shaping economic trends. Focusing on investment in 
innovations, the Schumpeterian tradition indicates that attempts to introduce new products and 
processes in the market are the qualifying condition for economic growth. Freeman et al. (1982) 
further elaborated on Schumpeter’s intuition by claiming that, in adverse economic environments, 
investments are likely to be reduced because of low profit margin and a general “pessimistic mood”, 
while in periods of economic expansion there are opportunities for new technology systems to 
emerge. In this article we focus on how a remarkable macroeconomic shock such as the current 
economic downturn has shaped firms’ innovation investment in comparison to the previous period. 
 
 
2.2. Why do ational Innovation Systems matter in time of crisis 
 
The persistent difference in terms of innovative capabilities across countries is one of the factors 
that explain their different economic performance, as stressed by the NSI literature (Lundvall, 1992; 
Nelson, 1993; Freeman, 1995). National institutions shape not only the structural conditions of 
countries, but also their ability to respond to changes. The way in which firms carry out innovation 
activities and set their learning processes is affected by a number of specific national factors 
(Archibugi and Michie, 1997; Lorenz and Lundvall, 2006), including the nature of the scientific and 
technological institutions, the education and training system, the financial system, the structure of 
the labour market, and industrial specialization.  
 
This is also associated with the fact that innovative activities at the firm level are cumulative and 
persistent (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Geroski et al., 1997; Patel and Pavitt, 1997; Cefis and 
Orsenigo, 2001). Previous literature has already shown how the sectoral dimensions of patterns of 
innovation are country specific (Malerba and Orsenigo, 1996; 1999) as well as firms’ persistency in 
innovating (Cefis and Orsenigo, 2001). Building on this literature, we explore whether some 
structural features of the NSI also affect firms’ innovation behaviour in cases of financial crises. 
Investigating the role played by some specific characteristics of the NSI in relation to exogenous 
shocks is something new and worth exploring. Do countries which have been accumulating larger 
“stocks” of knowledge embodied in human resources, learning institutions and companies show a 
greater persistency in their innovative activities? Which kind of industrial structure and 
technological specialization is more sensitive to a macroeconomic shock in terms of innovation? 
 
Already Schumpeter emphasized the relationship between finance and innovation (Schumpeter, 
1934. For recent analyses see Santarelli, 1995; O'Sullivan, 2005). A number of factors play a role in 
shaping the national environment and affect firms’ innovation behaviours during an economic 
downturn. Different levels of education and training systems of the labour force, together with 
different configurations of the labour market and welfare state, can generate different patterns of 
recovery since workers can be easily transferred from mature towards growing sectors of the 
economy (OECD, 2009b). A robust financial system might play a role in macroeconomic shocks if 
it can provide firms with resources to be invested in innovative activities. A different industrial 
specialization, e.g. in hi-tech manufacturing or knowledge-intensive service sector, could lead to a 
different impact of the depression on firms’ innovation investment depending on the magnitude of 
the drop in the domestic and external demand across the sectors. 
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In the empirical analysis carried out in the second part of this paper, four main components of a NSI 
are taken into account: i) the quality of the “stock” of the human resources of a country, in terms of 
levels of education and participation in life-long learning activities; ii) the stock of acquired 
knowledge, including R&D and non-R&D expenditures, patents, ICT expenditures; iii) the 
“financial depth” of the economic system in terms of the share of venture capital investment and 
credit towards the private sector from deposit-taking financial institutions; iv)  the specialization of 
the NSI in terms of the relative importance of the hi-tech manufacturing sector and the knowledge-
intensive service sector. 
 
2.3. The macroeconomic environment and innovation in time of crisis: the role of demand 
 
Already Jakob Schmookler (1966) emphasized the role of demand as an innovation driver, pointing 
out a strong relationship between investment in capital good users industries and patent applications 
in the same industries. Other scholars have empirically revisited and re-examined Schmookler’s 
hypothesis (see, among others, Scherer, 1982; Kleinknecht and Verspagen, 1990; Brouwer and 
Kleinknecht, 1999), producing some evidence which lends some support to the demand-pull 
determinants of innovation at the firm level. 
Demand-pull arguments have been suggested both in favour and against the cyclical hypothesis. On 
the one hand, it has been argued that established firms might delay the introduction of innovations 
as it requires a diversion of resources from on-going activities because they prefer to exploit the 
value of their existing rents (Mensch, 1979). Given that the value of existing rents decreases in a 
recession, in that case firms might be encouraged to introduce new products and processes. On the 
other hand, two arguments based on the role of demand suggest that innovations are more likely to 
be introduced during business cycle upswings. The first claims that rising demand during a boom 
provides more favourable conditions to absorb new products than a recession. The second argument 
suggests that because firms have only a limited period of time to appropriate the returns from their 
innovations, they are more likely to introduce new products and processes in an expanding market 
regardless when they produce them (for a review on this issue see Geroski and Walters, 1995). 
Geroski and Walters (1995) also show the presence of a long-run association between the level of 
demand and innovative activity, and they find that demand appears to Granger cause innovation. In 
a recent empirical study at the firm level, Bogliacino and Pianta (2009, p. 28) conclude that demand 
side factors have a significant influence on the growth of profits and on the innovation-related 
turnover (see also Piva and Vivarelli, 2007).  
Given the prominent role played by demand in the current economic downturn (OECD, 2009b 
World Bank, 2009), the question addressed here is to which extent the macroeconomic 
environment, in terms of the drop in the demand is playing a role in firms’ decisions about 
innovation investments. Two sources of demand are taken into account in the analysis: domestic 
demand and export. 
 
3. Data and methodology 
 
Our analysis is grounded on two Reports from the European Commission, the Innobarometer 2009 
and the European Innovation Scoreboard 2008 (European Commission, 2009a; European 
Commission, 2009b. For another analysis of these data, see Kanerva and Hollanders, 2009). The 
first is a survey which has been conducted during April 2009 in the 27 Member States of the EU, 
Norway and Switzerland, and it is now at its eight wave. The Innobarometer placed the focus on 
innovation spending at firm-level, including the effects of the economic downturn. Overall, 5,238 
enterprises across Europe were interviewed according to three main criteria: country, company size 
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(20-49, 50-249, 250+ employees) and activity sector. Both the Innobarometer 2009 and the 
European Innovation Scoreboard 2008 include the same countries and they are thereby suitable for 
a comparative cross-country analysis.  
 
As regards the Innobarometer, our analysis is based on the following two questions of the survey 
made on April 2009: (see Table A1 in the Appendix):    
1. Question no. 1: “Compared to 2006, has the amount spent by your firm on all innovation 
activities in 2008 increased, decreased, or stayed approximately the same (adjust for 
inflation)?” 
2. Question no. 2 “In the last six months has your company taken one of the following actions 
[increased, decreased or maintained the innovation spending] as a direct result of the economic 
downturn?” 
The first question regards the three years period 2006-2008, and the answers refer to trends of the 
European firms’ innovation spending before the crisis. In turn, the second question aims at 
capturing the direct effects of the current economic downturn on the firms’ innovation investments.  
 
Similarly to the Innobarometer, the European Innovation Scoreboard (EIS) is a Report of the 
European Commission – Directorate General Enterprises and Industry - carried out by the MERIT 
since 2001.
1
 The EIS aims at measuring and comparing the innovation performance at country level 
using a synthetic composite indicator. For our analysis we will use the current EIS composite 
indicator (European Commission, 2009a), which is based on twenty-nine indicators addressing 
several dimensions of a country’s system of innovation (see Table A2 in the appendix for a detailed 
list of the indicators).  
 
In this paper we will refer to the EIS composite indicator as InnoStruct to emphasize the fact that it 
provides a structural measure of innovation, in opposition to the Innobarometer which instead 
focuses on medium and short-term innovation investments. The InnoStruct, like many other 
composite indicators of technology indicators, has demonstrated to be a quite stable measure over 
time (for a review, see Archibugi et al., 2009). Accordingly, in this paper we take the InnoStruct as 
a measure of the strength of each national system of innovation (Lundvall et al., 2002). The 
InnoStruct is a composite indicator normalised between 0 and 1. 
 
We derived from Innobarometer the following two indicators: 
1. The Innovation Investments Indicator relative to the period 2006-2008 (InnoInv06-08), is based 
on the balance between the percentage of firms increasing and decreasing their innovation 
expenditures over the period 2006-2008 (see Table A1 in the Appendix). In this way, the 
InnoInv06-08 represents for us a baseline in terms of firms’ innovation investments before the 
crisis.  
2. The Innovation Investments Indicator relative to 2009 (InnoInv09), is instead based on the 
Innobarometer question relative to the direct impact of the economic downturn on firms’ 
innovation spending in 2009 (see Table A1 in the appendix). The InnoInv09 is thereby a short-
term indicator reflecting the firms’ innovation performance in response to the crisis.  
Similarly to the InnoStruct of the EIS, these two indicators are normalized ranging between 0 and 1. 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Both the Innobarometer and EIS reports can be found at: http://www.proinno-
europe.eu/index.cfm?fuseaction=page.display&topicID=51&parentID=48 
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4. The impact of the global economic turmoil and the uneven effects on the European 
countries
2
 
 
4.1. The effects of the recession on Europe 
 
We explore, in this section, the direct effects of the global economic turmoil on the investments in 
innovation across European firms. Although our data do not allow us to provide a comprehensive 
analysis since they reflect the firms’ behaviour at one point time only, they help identifying to what 
extent innovation investment was affected by the 2008 financial shock. In Fig. 1 we plot the average 
firms’ answers relative to the questions no. 1 and 2 of the Innobarometer. The responses clearly 
show that the economic downturn is having a profound impact on the firms’ innovation behaviour 
across Europe. The percentage of firms increasing their innovation expenditures drops dramatically 
as a direct effect of the crisis, from 40.2% to 10.6%. In turn, the percentage of firms decreasing 
their innovation spending surges from 10.8% up to 26.7%. However, the presence of a high number 
of firms which are expected to maintain their innovation spending at the same level, which has 
increased to more than 60% from about 50%, is also remarkable. 
 
Fig. 1 
Firms’ innovation expenditures: comparison between the three years before the crisis and in response to the crisis 
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Source: author’s elaboration on the two questions of the Innobarometer (see Tables A1 in the appendix) 
 
The impact of the economic downturn on firms’ innovation spending is also more evident if we 
look at the data at the country level, reported in the Fig. 2. Here we plot the difference between the 
percentage of firms increasing and decreasing their innovation spending relative to both periods 
2006-2008 and 2009. The differences between the results relative to the two periods are striking. If 
we look along the x-axis, reflecting the innovation expenditures over the 2006-2008, all the 
countries show a positive balance, that is, the percentage of firms increasing their innovation 
spending is higher then firms decreasing them for all the considered countries. But if we turn to the 
y-axis, we see that only four countries are resisting above the dot line, which corresponds to a 
balance equal to zero in 2009. As a direct effect of the economic downturn, in Switzerland, Sweden, 
Austria and Finland only the percentage of firms declaring to increase their innovation spending is 
higher than the percentage of firms declaring they disinvest. Across all the other countries, the 
                                                 
2
 Both Cyprus and Malta have been excluded from the analysis. 
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percentage of firms reducing investments in innovation is higher that those increasing their 
innovation expenditures. As a whole, the average balance across Europe passed from a 29.4% 
relative to 2006-2008 period to a -16% in 2009.  
 
Fig. 2 
The balances of firms investing and disinvesting in innovation before and after the crisis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: as for Fig. 1 
ote: axis cross at average values 
 
 
4.2. The uneven impact of the crisis across European countries 
 
Fig. 3 shows the results of InnoInv06-08 in reference to the situation three years ago. Two groups of 
countries appear to have further increased their innovative effort: catching-up and the traditional 
innovation champions. Among the former, we find EU New Member States such as Romania, 
Lithuania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Poland and Slovenia, among the latter Sweden, Switzerland, 
Germany and Finland. Along the political and economic process of convergence undertaken by 
these countries, most of them have been also catching-up in terms of firms’ innovation spending 
with respect to the other Member States (for an assessment on the EU enlargement policies see Von 
Tunzelmann, 2004). 
Belgium
Bulgaria
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Italy
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxemburg
Poland
Portugal Slovakia
Spain
Switzerland
Austria
Czech rep.
Denmark
Estonia
Ireland
Netherlands
Norway
Romania
Sweden
United Kingdom
EU27
-50
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Firms innovation investments balance 2006-2008 (% firms increasing - % firms decreasing)
F
ir
m
s
 i
n
n
o
v
a
ti
o
n
 i
n
v
e
s
tm
e
n
ts
 b
a
la
n
c
e
 2
0
0
9
  
(%
 f
ir
m
s
 
in
c
re
a
s
in
g
 -
 %
 f
ir
m
s
 d
e
c
re
a
s
in
g
)
Innovation investments balance  = 0 in 2009
 8 
Fig. 3  
Innovation performance over the period 2006-2008 (InnoInv06-08)*  
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Source: author’s elaboration on Innobarometer data  
* Calculated on the question no.1 of the Innobarometer :“Compared to 2006, has the amount spent by your firm on all 
innovation activities in 2008 increased, decreased, or stayed approximately the same (adjust for inflation)?” (see Table 
A1 in the appendix) 
 
In Fig. 4 we bring the strength of each NSI on the y-axis through an index of structural innovative 
capacity such as the InnoStruct  and on the x-axis the InnoInv06-08 performance (see section three). 
On the ground of a cluster analysis
3
 using the two indexes as variables four groups have been 
identified: 
1. The catching-up countries: although they do not show a high strength of their national 
innovation system, they have been increasing their investments more than the average relative to 
the considered period. This group includes five New Member States; 
2. The frontrunners: this group consists of those countries which show both a consolidated 
structural leadership of their innovation performance, and at the same time, they keep increasing 
their investments in innovation;  
3. The declining: these countries which, despite having a strong national innovation system, have 
been relatively increasing their innovation expenditures less over the 2006-2008 period; 
4. Finally, the lagging-behind: is that group of countries characterized both by a low innovation 
performance at national level and a low performance in firms’ innovation spending. 
Interestingly, this group includes both New Member States such as Hungary and Latvia, as well 
as large countries like Italy and Spain. 
 
                                                 
3
 A kmedians cluster analysis has been performed, using group medians from k partitions as a technique of 
agglomeration. 
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Fig. 4 
Innovation performance (InnoInv06-08) and national innovation system strength (InnoStruct) 
 
Source: author’s elaboration on Innobarometer data (as for Fig. 3), and on EIS data (see Table A2 in the appendix) 
ote: axis cross at average values 
 
As predicted by Neo-Schumpeterian theories, catching-up processes do not occur automatically in 
response to mere technology gaps (Fagerberg, 1994). From Fig. 4 we observe that the there is a 
positive trend of alignment of the former socialist block, and now New Member Countries. Most of 
these countries are among the Catching-up countries group, except for Estonia, Latvia and 
Hungary. Second, the brilliant performance of the Frontrunners does not seem to be a hereditary 
privilege but rather it is the result of systematic efforts which allow their economies to keep on 
learning along cumulative patterns. While the innovative systems’ strength is inherently a structural 
feature, at the end of the day it is the result of years of know-how accumulation (Pavitt, 1988). 
Finally, the Lagging-behind group includes those countries which are likely to widen their 
innovation delay in comparison to their direct competitors. To sum up, we do not observe a clear 
relationship between a structural measure of innovation, such as the strength of the innovation 
systems, and a measure of firms’ innovation before the crisis. This is also confirmed by the low 
correlation rate between the InnoStruct and the InnoInv06-08 which is equal to 0.14. 
 
In Fig. 5 we plot on the y-axis the InnoStruct performance, while on the x-axis we report the 
InnoInv09 indicator. In this way, it is possible to explore the effects of the downturn on the groups of 
countries. First, with respect to Fig. 4, countries belonging to the Catching-up countries such as 
Romania, Lithuania and Poland disappeared from the lower-right quadrant, while Bulgaria and 
Slovakia moved closer to the y-axis. Secondly, a different picture emerges as well in the upper-right 
quadrant. The five countries included in the Frontrunners, namely Sweden, Switzerland, Germany, 
Finland and Austria are all still there, but together with several other countries which have been 
moving towards them. Overall, Fig. 5 shows that the relationship between the NSI strength and the 
firms’ innovation behaviour in response to the crisis is much deeper than in Fig. 4. As a 
consequence of the crisis, the distance between the Frontrunners and the other countries is 
increasing.    
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Fig. 5  
Short-term firms’ innovation performance (InnoInv09), and national innovation system strength (InnoStruct) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: author’s elaboration on question no. 2 of the Innobarometer data (see Table A1 in the appendix), and on EIS 
data (see Table A2 in the appendix) 
ote: axis cross at average values.  
 
To recap, the evidence of this first descriptive part of the paper suggests two major points: 
• The uneven effects of the crisis. The impact of the current global economic downturn on firms’ 
investment in innovative activities has not the same magnitude across European countries.  On 
the contrary, the most struck have been those New Member States which were catching up over 
the years 2006-2008 
• Structure matters: considering the effects of the economic downturn on the firms’ innovation 
behaviour, countries endowed with stronger national innovation systems are also those less 
affected, in relative terms, by the recession. This clearly emerges in opposition to the 2006-2008 
period in which we do not observe a significant relationship between trends in firms’ innovation 
investments and the strength of the NSI. 
 
Why countries are differently affected by the crisis? And what are the characteristics of the SI 
which are playing a role in making some countries relatively less affected by the crisis? The next 
section attempts to answer these questions. 
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5. The uneven effects of the crisis on innovation investment across countries: some 
explanations 
 
We will now attempt to provide some explanations for the uneven effects of the crisis across 
countries. Two categories of explanations are addressed: i. some structural characteristics of the 
NSI, and ii. the drop in the domestic demand and export. 
 
5.1 The variables 
 
In order to carry out the analysis, a new variable has been developed merging the two main 
questions from the Innobarometer used in Section two (see Table 1). The new dependent variable – 
INVchange - reflects a change in the behaviour of the firm related to its innovation investment as a 
response to the crisis vis-à-vis the period before the crisis. Three different behaviours are then 
identified by juxtaposing firms’ innovative behaviours before and in response to the recession: 
cyclical, neutral and counter-cyclical. Two reasons lead us to construct this new variable. First, it 
allows summarizing the different behaviours of the firms in the two different periods in one single 
variable with a relevant gain in the simplicity and robustness of the analysis, as well as in the 
interpretation of the results. Secondly, it allows looking at the very changes in firms’ innovative 
behaviour in response to the crisis. For example, firms which were decreasing investment in the 
previous period and keep on decreasing them during the crisis are not considered as changing their 
behaviour. This allows us to identify the very effect of the crisis in changing the attitude of the 
firms: cyclical vs. counter-cyclical behaviours.  
 
Table 1 
Change in the behaviour of the firm related to its innovation investment as a response to the crisis vis-à-vis the period 
before the crisis 
 
Variable Value assumed by 
the variable 
Behaviour of the firm 
= 1  
 
Cyclical (e.g. firms which were increasing and pass to 
maintaining or decreasing in response to the crisis) 
 
= 0  
 
Neutral (e.g. firms which were increasing and keep on 
increasing) 
 
Change in innovation 
behaviour (INVchange) =  
[- (INVEST2 – INVEST1)] 
= -1 Counter-cyclical (e.g. firms which were decreasing and pass 
to increasing or maintain) 
 
Note: INVEST1 and INVEST2 relate respectively to the three-year period before the crisis and to the crisis. They are 
categorical variables which assume the following values: = 1 if firm increases investment, = 0 if firms maintain 
investment at the same level, and = -1 if decreases investment.  
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Fig. 6 
Firms’ innovation investment behaviour in response to the crisis  
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Source: author’s elaboration on Innobarometer data (as for Fig. 1) 
 
In Fig. 6 the INVchange variable is plotted. What emerges clearly is the prominence of the cyclical 
behaviour of the firms. Nearly fifty per cent of the firms in the sample exhibits a cyclical behaviour, 
and forty per cent of firms are instead neutral. Finally, only six per cent of the firms in the sample 
seems inclined to exploit the current situation by investing more in innovation, while in the 
previous period they were either maintaining or decreasing innovation expenditures. From the 
operational standpoint, in what follows we try to point out those country-specific features which 
have a role in offsetting the cyclical behaviour of the firms. The following different characteristics 
of the NSI have been derived from the EIS: i. the stock of knowledge; ii. the quality of the human 
resources; iii. the depth of the financial and credit system; iv. the specialization of the country (see 
Table 2; see also Table A3 for the construction of the composite variables “knowledge” and 
“human resources”).  
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Table 2 
Characteristics of the NSI included in the analysis 
 
(IS characteristics Variable Indicator 
Business R&D 
Business R&D expenditures 
(% of GDP) 
Public R&D 
Public R&D expenditures 
(% of GDP) 
Non-R&D expenditure 
Non-R&D innovation 
expenditures (% of 
turnover) 
EPO patents 
EPO patents per million 
population 
Stock of knowledge 
IT expenditures IT expenditures (% of GDP) 
S&E and SSH graduates 
S&E and SSH graduates per 
1000 population aged 20- 
29 (first stage of tertiary 
education) 
S&E and SSH doctorate graduates 
S&E and SSH doctorate 
graduates per 1000 
population aged 25-34 
(second stage of tertiary 
education) 
Tertiary education 
Population with tertiary 
education per 100 
population aged 25-64 
Life-long learning 
Participation in life-long 
learning per 100 population 
aged 25-64 
Human resources 
Youth education 
Youth education attainment 
Level 
Venture capital Venture capital (% of GDP) 
Credit system 
Private credit Private credit (% of GDP) 
Employment in medium-high & high-tech 
manufacturing 
Employment in medium-high 
& high-tech 
manufacturing (% of 
work-force) 
Industrial Specialization 
Employment in knowledge-intensive services Employment in knowledge 
intensive 
services (% of 
workforce) 
Source: (European Commission, 2009b) 
 
In order to capture the role played by the short-term macroeconomic environment, we build two 
different variables. The first – domestic demand drop - reflects the drop in the domestic demand of 
the country and is calculated as the percentage variation between the third term 2009 and the first 
term 2008. The second – export drop – reflects the drop in the exports of the country and is 
calculated in the same way over the same period of time. In this way we seek to gage the drop of the 
demand during the crisis distinguishing among domestic and external demand. In Fig. 7 we report 
these variables for the countries considered. While the drop in export has been remarkable for 
nearly every country, there is a good deal of variance in the drop in domestic demand. New 
Member States, and to a lesser extent Sweden, Ireland and the UK, are facing the larger drops in 
domestic demand. 
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Fig. 7 
The drops in the domestic demand and export, 1
st
 term 2008 – 3
rd
 term 2009 
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Source: author’s elaboration on Eurostat data “Euro-indicators” 
 
 
  5.2 The results 
 
Table 3 presents the “robust” estimates of an ordered logit model in which the dependent variables 
is INVchange (positive values of the independent variable reflect cyclical behaviours of the firm, 
thus negative coefficient signals those country-effects which offset cyclical behaviour). Three sets 
of independent variables are included (correlation rates are reported in Table A4). The first reflects 
the magnitude of the drops in the domestic demand and export. The second group includes the 
variables accounting for the characteristics of the NIS. The third group includes the interaction 
effects between demand effects and NIS effects. Finally, a set of variables controlling for the 
individual characteristics of the firms is included. Specifically, we introduce three binary variables 
at the firm level – i.e. size, innovation intensity and internationalisation – in order to control for firm 
idiosyncratic effects, together with industry dummies.      
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Table 3 
Ordered logit model, robust estimates (dependent variable: INVchange) 
  
Model no. 1 Model no. 2 Model no. 3 
        
   Demand effects    
Domestic demand drop 1.26*** 0.52 0.72 
Export drop 1.72*** -0.60 -0.43 
    
   (ational Innovation System effects    
Knowledge  0.07 1.82 
Human Resources  -0.13 4.77** 
Venture capital  -0.02 -0.15 
Private credit  -0.41*** -0.54*** 
Hi-tech manufacturing specialization  -0.73*** -3.33*** 
Knowledge intensive service specialization  0.29 -2.25** 
    
   Interaction effects    
Demand*knowledge   0.19 
Demand*human resources   -4.81** 
Demand*hi-tech specialization   1.35 
Demand* KIS service specialization   2.45** 
Export*knowledge   -1.57 
Export*human resources   -4.75** 
Export*hi-tech specialization   2.72*** 
Export* KIS service specialization   3.46** 
    
   Firm level control variables    
Medium and large firms 0.24*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 
Highly innovative firms 0.78*** 0.79*** 0.82*** 
Internationalised firms 0.06 0.13 0.13 
Industry dummies included included included 
    
Observations 3072 3072 3072 
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
 
In model no. 1, only the demand effects are included, together with the control variables. It arises 
that both domestic demand and export are statistically significant and positive. In the first place, this 
seems to suggest that the drop in demand played a substantial role in explaining the cyclical 
behaviour of the firms. When in model no. 2 the NSI effects are added, both private credit and 
technological manufacturing specialization arise as negative and significant. That is, these are the 
country characteristics of the NSI which tend to offset the cyclical behaviour of firms. In this model 
demand effects no longer show up as significant.  
 
Model no. 3 is a multiplicative interaction model. These models are common in the quantitative 
political science literature in which it is frequently implied that the relationship between political 
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inputs and outcomes varies depending on the institutional context. It has been acknowledged that 
the intuition behind the relevance of context, or ‘‘context conditionality”, is captured quite well by 
multiplicative interaction models (Friedrich, 1982; Aiken and West, 1991). In interaction models to 
the independent variables - the constitutive variables – there are added the interaction variables, 
thus taking the following form: 
 
                                                        Y = β 0 + β 1X + β 2Z + β 3XZ + ε  (1) 
 
In these models usually Z is a binary variable in order to make the results easier to interpret. It 
should be born in mind that  β 1 must not be interpreted as the average effect of a change in X on Y 
as it can in a linear-additive regression model. Rather, β 1 captures the effect of a one-unit change in 
X on Y when condition Z is absent. When condition Z is present (Z=1), equation (1) becomes: 
 
                                                          Y = (β 0 + β 2) + (β 1  + β 3)X + ε  (2) 
 
Hence, the effects of the constitutive variable X is (β 1  + β 3). Our model includes two sets of 
constitutive variables, the NIS variables and the demand ones. In this way we are able to explore the 
interaction effects of the two different dimensions of a country which, as a matter of fact, interact in 
reality. Both the drop in demand and export have been transformed into binary variables taking 
value equal to 1 whether the drop in domestic demand (or export) is higher then the average and 0 if 
lower.
4
  
 
The results of model no.3 are showed in Table 3. If we consider the overall effects of the NIS 
variables (therefore by adding all the related coefficients, see eq. 2) the variables offsetting the 
cyclical behaviour of firms are human resources, private credit and high-technological 
manufacturing sectors, similarly to the previous model (apart from the human resources 
coefficient). The only coefficient predicting on the overall cyclical behaviour of the firm is the 
specialization in knowledge-intensive service. By looking at the interaction effects, one can observe 
the remarkable role played by the presence of qualified human resources in contrasting the cyclical 
behaviour of the firms in countries characterized by both a large drop in domestic demand and 
export. On the contrary, in those countries the specialization in knowledge-intensive service sectors 
predicts cyclical behaviour. As far as the manufacturing sector is concerned, specialization in high-
technology is associated to cyclical behaviour of firms in the case of a large drop in export.  
 
                                                 
4
 We also tried to take 1 whether the drop in domestic demand or export is higher then the third quartile but we prefer 
the current choice because it allows including more countries. 
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6. Discussion and policy implications 
 
 
In this section the research questions put forward in the introduction are discussed in the light of the 
results of the empirical analysis. Secondly, some policy recommendations addressing innovation 
during the crisis are discussed. Finally, we point out the limitations of the current analysis and the 
prospects for future research.    
 
6.1. Is innovation cyclical? 
 
One of the most significant results of our analysis is that about sixty-five per cent of the firms 
declare to maintain their innovation investment unchanged in spite of the crisis. This somehow 
confirms the importance of cumulative technological accumulation (stressed, among others, by 
Nelson and Winter, 1982; Grandstrand et al., 1997; Patel and Pavitt, 1997) and the persistency of 
innovative activities over time (Geroski et al., 1997; Cefis and Orsenigo, 2001). But accumulation 
and persistency do not explain all firms’ behaviour: we also observe a good deal of cyclical 
innovative behaviours across firms. Significantly, firms which exhibit a cyclical behaviour are the 
major innovators. In fact, firms which are more likely to reduce investment in response to the crisis 
are characterized by: i. larger innovation intensity (in terms of share of turnover invested in 
innovation); ii. larger size (see Table 3). We can speculate that firms are maintaining innovation 
activities related to on-going projects which are often characterized by some degree of rigidity and 
consistent sunk costs, but appear less willing to start new innovation projects.  
 
6.2. The uneven effects of the crisis and the role of ational Systems of Innovation 
 
The other two research questions here addressed are: i. do significant cross-country differences 
emerge in terms of firms’ innovation behaviour? ii. which factors can explain the presence of cross-
country differences? It has clearly emerged that the crisis has not the same magnitude across all 
European countries. On the contrary, we have shown that the most negatively affected by the 
downturn are those EU New Member States which were catching-up over the 2006-2008 period. 
Countries endowed with stronger NSI are, on the contrary, less affected and are better able to 
respond, at least in relative terms, to the recession. And this should be contrasted with the previous 
period of moderate economic expansion (2006-2008), when firms were expanding their investment 
in innovation in most countries and regardless of the strength of their NSI. 
 
We have attempted to explain this evidence on the ground of the structural characteristics of the 
NSI and the role played by domestic demand and export. The structural characteristics of the NSI 
seem to play a more relevant role then demand. Hence, the hypothesis that the characteristics of the 
NSI can affect the way firms react to an external shock as the actual global turmoil is confirmed by 
the results. Specifically, the presence of qualified human resources plays a crucial role in 
cushioning the effects of a downswing in innovation in frontrunner countries. This seems to be less 
the case in catching up countries; this result reflects mostly the ex-Socialist nations, the largest 
group of catching up countries here considered. Apparently, the high level of human resources in 
the previously planned economies have not yet been fully incorporated into the new competitive 
economy and therefore do not play the “brake” effect in terms of reduction of investment in 
innovation. When the interaction with demand is also included, the availability of human resources 
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arises as the most important factor in contrasting a reduction of firms’ innovation expenditures. 
Firms are very reluctant to fire qualified workers also when facing a drop in their demand.
5
 
 
Our results show that the decisions to invest in innovation relative to the knowledge intensive sector 
is particularly sensitive to the domestic demand. This can be explained by the fact that this sector 
includes both the financial intermediation industry and the real estate industry which have been 
severely hit by the crisis. That decisions to invest in innovation are particularly sensitive to exports 
in both the hi-tech manufacturing and knowledge intensive sector comes as no surprise: firms’ 
internationalization and their innovative activities go hand in hand (Filippetti et al., 2009; Frenz and 
Ietto-Gillies, 2009; Frenz et al., 2009). The “depth” of the financial system, in terms of the 
dimension of private credit, seems to play an important role in counteracting the effect of the crisis 
on firms’ innovation expenditures. In general, this finding reinforces the importance of the financial 
sector for innovation, not only as an engine in times of growth but also as a buffer during a 
downswing. This is particularly important for the EU New Members Countries which have not 
developed a sufficiently robust domestic financial market. The substantial escape of foreign capital 
which occurred quickly as the crisis burst out, coupled with an insufficient supply of domestic 
credit, is very likely to have played a substantial role in the reduction of innovation investment of 
firms. 
 
 
6.3. Which policies in times of crisis? 
 
On the grounds of our results, what will the economic crisis bring in terms of innovative capabilities 
across Europe? And what can we learn to inspire policy analysis? There is evidence that the crisis is 
hitting countries with a less developed NSI, namely the New Member States. This will lead to an 
increase in their technological gap which, especially for ex-Socialist economies, is still huge. It will 
not be easy to recycle the skills and the human resources available into a competitive economy. 
There is the risk that the effects of the downturn will turn out to be structural, and as a result of the 
crisis at least some of the New Member States will be no longer able to sustain the catching-up 
process they started before the recession. 
 
It remains to be seen how these countries will be able to react since competences, skills and 
knowledge are not an ephemeral phenomena, but are rather embedded in organizations’ routine, 
firms’ capabilities, workers’ skills and capital goods (Lall, 1992; Evangelista, 1999; Massini et al., 
2002). Will the structural components of competence and skills prevail over the adverse short term 
economic environment? And how will the new economic environment be transformed by the crisis? 
There is no guarantee that after the turmoil the loci of the competitive advantage will remain the 
same. New sectors can emerge as a result of new technological opportunities as well as of 
substantial public policies that governments are enacting to hamper the effects of the crisis. A case 
in point is the “green industry”, which is believed to represent a fundamental source of innovation 
and growth for the coming future (OECD, 2009a).  
 
Periods of technological breakthroughs can represent a crucial “window of opportunity” for lagging 
behind countries to catch-up (Perez and Soete, 1986). However, catching-up processes based on the 
adoption of technology require a reliable base of internal knowledge, human resources and 
infrastructures. Winners and losers are not easily identifiable when the game is still ongoing. But 
the winners are more likely to be those countries which are equipped with both strong innovative 
infrastructures and domestic knowledge base. On the other hand, the capacity of the catching-up 
                                                 
5
 This point suggests that there can be differences across the countries depending on the different structure and 
organization of the labour market, but this topic is out of the scope of this paper (see however Lorenz and Lundvall, 
2006).  
 19 
countries to recover their previous catching-up patterns cannot be taken for granted. This will 
crucially depend on their capacity to maintain their acquired knowledge, skills, competences and 
human resources in their business sector and within their borders.  
 
The empirical analysis has shown the crucial role played by qualified human resources in reducing 
the effects of the crisis. In some countries, the crisis is already bringing about the emigration of 
skilled workers, budget cuts to the R&D public spending and to the educational system, as well as 
the weakening of the credit system and infrastructures. If these factors are not properly counter-
acted by public and business policies, there is the risk that NSI will be substantially weakened and 
that the potential for growth in the coming years will be undermined. The large public expenditures 
programmes put forward by most of the States in response to the crisis do represent crucial means 
to sustain current innovation capabilities. The choice of sectors and the design of public 
procurement policies can provide new opportunities and it is very likely that those that manage to 
capture them will be the winners and those who do not will become the losers. 
 
As argued by the technological accumulation hypothesis, technological discontinuities do not 
necessarily imply new and different competences and skills (Pavitt, 1988; Patel and Pavitt, 1999). 
Keeping on investing in knowledge, human resources and structures is the best way to cope with 
(uncertain) scientific and technological evolution. New sectors and technological opportunities will 
emerge after the crisis and a process of re-specialization is expected to be crucial for recovering 
(Perez, 2009b). Those countries which maintain their innovation capabilities will be more likely to 
be ready to exploit the recovery and expansion of the market in the new emerging sectors. In a 
recent study from the OECD (2009b), paradigmatic examples of counter-cyclical policies carried 
out during recent periods of recession in Finland and Korea are reported. In line with our argument 
they claim that policies aimed at supporting business and public R&D (the latter was increased 
during the recession by these Governments), as well as policies directed at stimulating job 
opportunities for skilled labour were very important in putting these economies on a stronger and 
more knowledge-intensive growth path (OECD, 2009b).    
 
 
6.4. Limitations of the current analysis and prospects for future research 
 
We are well aware of the limitations of our data. As often stated, the responses collected by the 
Innobarometer refer to firms’ perceptions in a period of time. Time series data would be able to 
provide much better information on the effects of the crisis, and the next surveys will certainly shed 
light on this. Further research is needed, to be carried out when more accurate data is available. This 
will make it possible to investigate more in depth the dynamics of the micro behaviours and macro 
aggregates. The data here considered, moreover, provide information on innovating firms that are 
already into business now. They cannot tell us if in an unknown garage the Bill Gates or Steve Jobs 
of the future are already at work. Both Gates and Jobs founded Microsoft and Apple respectively in 
the 1970s, when everyone was playing the “The Dying Swan” of the international economy. In 
short, these data cannot tell us how creative the destruction process of the economic downturn 
actually is. However, we have taken into account the fresher dataset available at the micro level. 
Thanks to the particular nature of the survey it was possible to compare the firms’ innovation 
behaviour before and in response to the crisis.  
 
We also had to limit our analysis to European countries only. Unfortunately, we do not have similar 
data regarding non-EU countries such as United States, Japan, or emerging economies such as 
China and India. A European would naturally wonder: what if these countries are not reacting like 
the European countries vis-à-vis the current recession? What if their firms are not decreasing their 
innovation investments – or are decreasing them to a considerable lesser extent? We have learnt 
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from the past that the way firms and countries react to the global turmoil will likely decide who will 
hold the technological leadership of the global economy in the coming future.  
 
 
7.   Conclusions 
 
This paper represents an attempt to explore empirically the effects of the current economic crisis on 
innovation across the European countries and to propose some explanations for it. A substantial 
amount of firms have managed to maintain their investment for innovation, but the number of firms 
able to expand it has dramatically dropped, and the firms that have decreased it have also 
substantially increased. This trend is not distributed uniformly across the European economic space. 
The most affected have been the European catching up countries, namely the New Member 
Countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The crisis has, so far, stopped a tiring process in which 
these countries were trying to increase their efforts also as a consequence of joining the EU market. 
 
We have also seen that the countries that were relatively less affected are those with the stronger 
NSI. Switzerland, Sweden, Finland, Germany and Austria will emerge from this crisis with a 
relatively stronger innovative capacity, while the United Kingdom and France, and to a larger 
extent, the Southern European countries, are likely to lose additional relative positions. Within a 
perspective of increasing integration, this calls for a stronger and cooperative innovation policy at 
European level not only in good times but especially in bad times. 
 
Two different categories of explanation have been addressed: i. some structural characteristics of 
the NSI, and ii. the magnitude of the macroeconomic shock in terms of the drop in domestic 
demand and export. The competences and quality of human resources, the specialization in the hi-
technology sector together with the development of the credit system seem to be the structural 
factors which are able to mitigate the effects of the economic downturn on innovation investments 
of the firms across Europe. The fact that the structural characteristics of the NSI affect not only the 
patterns of innovation of firms as suggested in the literature, but also their innovation behaviour in 
response to major exogenous shocks is an important finding. It sheds some light on the behaviour of 
firms during crisis, and represents a step forward in terms of understanding the mechanisms 
underlying the relationship between macro and micro determinants of innovation which lie at the 
hearth of the NSI theory. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1 
Results from the two questions* from the Innobarometer 2009**  
  Question no. 1 (2006-2008)   Quesiton no. 2 (2009) 
Country 
Increased 
% 
Decreased 
% 
Stayed 
the 
same % 
Total 
 
Increased 
      % 
Decreased 
% 
Stayed 
the 
same % 
Total 
Austria 40.8 5.8 53.4 100  11.2 10.7 78.1 100 
Belgium 40.1 9.4 50.5 100  12.0 17.6 70.5 100 
Bulgaria 52.6 10.1 37.3 100  11.9 25.7 62.3 100 
Czech rep. 40.3 13.1 46.6 100  13.8 29.6 56.5 100 
Denmark 35.2 10.4 54.4 100  17.2 24.9 57.9 100 
Estonia 32.0 14.9 53.1 100  7.9 29.6 62.5 100 
Finland 42.7 6.4 50.9 100  16.7 14.8 68.5 100 
France 35.3 7.0 57.7 100  7.0 29.7 63.2 100 
Germany 43.2 5.2 51.5 100  10.3 14.4 75.3 100 
Greece 45.8 15.0 39.2 100  2.0 49.3 48.7 100 
Hungary 36.0 21.3 42.7 100  4.6 32.2 63.2 100 
Ireland 30.8 14.9 54.3 100  9.9 32.1 58.0 100 
Italy 35.8 13.4 50.8 100  8.9 26.1 65.0 100 
Latvia 27.3 21.2 51.5 100  9.2 51.0 39.8 100 
Lithuania 54.9 11.0 34.2 100  6.3 49.1 44.6 100 
Luxemburg 31.9 5.6 62.5 100  8.6 16.9 74.5 100 
Netherlands 35.6 8.7 55.7 100  10.4 16.8 72.8 100 
Norway 35.8 6.9 57.3 100  12.9 27.2 59.8 100 
Poland 46.1 13.3 40.6 100  8.2 33.8 58.0 100 
Portugal 37.2 14.0 48.8 100  13.4 28.2 58.4 100 
Romania 56.4 9.2 34.4 100  10.7 38.8 50.5 100 
Slovakia 48.6 9.9 41.5 100  16.5 30.7 52.7 100 
Slovenia 39.5 9.1 51.3 100  5.1 20.6 74.2 100 
Spain 28.8 11.2 60.0 100  10.1 27.2 62.7 100 
Sweden 54.2 5.8 40.0 100  14.8 12.6 72.6 100 
Switzerland 47.8 8.9 43.4 100  17.5 9.0 73.5 100 
United Kingdom 32.9 9.6 57.5 100   8.5 23.2 68.4 100 
 
Source: author’s elaboration on Innobarometer 2009 (European Commission, 2009) 
 
*Question no. 1: “Compared to 2006, has the amount spent by your firm on all innovation activities in 2008 increased, 
decreased, or stayed approximately the same (adjust for inflation)?” 
 
Question no. 2: “In the last six months has your company taken one of the following actions [increased, decreased or 
maintain the innovation spending] as a direct result of the economic downturn?” (question made on April 2009) 
 
**With respect to the Innobarometer 2009, the results are been re-scaled to make them comparable across countries  
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Table A2 
Indicators for the InnoStruct of the European Innovation Scoreboard 2008 
Dimension Indicators 
  
S&E and SSH graduates per 1000 population aged 20-29 (first stage of tertiary education) 
S&E and SSH doctorate graduates per 1000 population aged 25-34 (second stage of tertiary education) 
Population with tertiary education per 100 population aged 25-64 
Participation in life-long learning per 100 population aged 25-64 
Human resources 
Youth education attainment level 
  
Public R&D expenditures (% of GDP) 
Venture capital (% of GDP) 
Private credit (relative to GDP) 
Finance and support 
Broadband access by firms (% of firms) 
  
Business R&D expenditures (% of GDP) 
IT expenditures (% of GDP) Firm investments 
Non-R&D innovation expenditures (% of turnover) 
  
SMEs innovating in-house (% of SMEs) 
Innovative SMEs collaborating with others (% of SMEs) 
Firm renewal (SME entries plus exits) (% of SMEs) 
Linkages &  
entrepreneurship 
Public-private co-publications per million population 
  
EPO patents per million population 
Community trademarks per million population 
Community designs per million population 
Throughputs 
Technology Balance of Payments flows (% of GDP) 
  
SMEs introducing product or process innovations (% of SMEs) 
SMEs introducing marketing or organisational innovations (% of SMEs) 
Share of innovators where innovation has signifi cantly reduced labour costs (% of firms) 
Innovators 
Share of innovators where innovation has signifi cantly reduced the use of materials and energy (% of firms) 
  
Employment in medium-high & high-tech manufacturing (% of workforce) 
Employment in knowledge-intensive services (% of workforce) 
Medium and high-tech manufacturing exports (% of total exports) 
Knowledge-intensive services exports (% of total services exports) 
New-to-market sales (% of turnover) 
Economic effects 
New-to-firm sales (% of turnover) 
 
Source: European Innovation Scoreboard 2008 (European Commission, 2009b) 
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Table A3 
The construction of the variables “human resources” and “knowledge” from the EIS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Country Innostruct
S&E 
graduates
S&E 
doctoral
Tertiary 
education
Life-long 
learning
Youth 
education
human
resources
business 
R&D
public 
R&D
non-R&D 
expenditure
patent
IT
expenditure
knowledge
Austria 0.53 21.60 1.72 17.60 12.80 84.10 0.42 1.81 0.75 . 183.10 2.80 0.63
Belgium 0.51 33.10 0.94 32.10 7.20 82.60 0.46 1.30 0.57 0.73 129.10 2.80 0.46
Bulgaria 0.22 31.50 0.36 22.40 1.30 83.30 0.31 0.15 0.33 0.79 1.40 2.00 0.17
Czech rep. 0.40 25.80 0.86 13.70 5.70 91.80 0.33 0.98 0.55 0.88 7.30 3.20 0.39
Denmark 0.57 46.80 0.93 32.20 29.20 70.80 0.59 1.65 0.88 0.51 174.60 3.20 0.58
Estonia 0.45 38.20 0.57 33.30 7.00 80.90 0.45 0.54 0.58 3.36 5.60 2.90 0.47
Finland 0.61 38.30 2.17 36.40 23.40 86.50 0.72 2.51 0.94 . 267.60 3.20 0.82
France 0.50 62.00 1.13 26.80 7.40 82.40 0.55 1.31 0.74 0.33 119.20 3.10 0.48
Germany 0.58 25.90 1.56 24.30 7.80 72.50 0.38 1.77 0.76 1.07 275.00 2.90 0.63
Greece 0.36 25.30 0.58 22.00 2.10 82.10 0.30 0.15 0.41 0.74 6.50 1.20 0.13
Hungary 0.32 30.20 0.42 18.00 3.60 84.00 0.30 0.49 0.46 0.72 7.80 2.50 0.27
Ireland 0.53 62.10 1.11 32.20 7.60 86.70 0.61 0.88 0.44 0.96 64.10 1.50 0.29
Italy 0.35 32.10 0.89 13.60 6.20 76.30 0.29 0.55 0.52 1.10 76.10 1.70 0.32
Latvia 0.24 56.40 0.24 22.60 7.10 80.20 0.42 0.21 0.42 . 5.70 2.30 0.21
Lithuania 0.29 60.30 0.61 28.90 5.30 89.00 0.54 0.23 0.58 0.64 1.30 1.80 0.20
Luxemburg 0.52 . . 26.50 7.00 70.90 0.39 1.36 0.27 0.90 194.90 . 0.40
Netherlands 0.48 36.00 0.87 30.80 16.60 76.20 0.49 1.03 0.67 0.29 173.30 3.30 0.48
Norway 0.38 29.40 0.94 34.40 18.00 93.30 0.58 0.81 0.77 0.17 95.50 2.40 0.37
Poland 0.31 52.90 0.86 18.70 5.10 91.60 0.47 0.18 0.38 1.03 3.00 2.60 0.26
Portugal 0.36 30.60 2.75 13.70 4.40 53.40 0.31 0.61 0.46 0.95 7.40 1.80 0.25
Romania 0.28 40.90 0.48 12.00 1.30 77.40 0.26 0.22 0.31 1.08 0.70 2.10 0.20
Slovakia 0.31 24.40 0.89 14.40 3.90 91.30 0.32 0.18 0.27 1.51 5.80 2.50 0.28
Slovenia 0.45 41.00 0.96 22.20 14.80 91.50 0.51 0.94 0.60 1.12 32.20 2.20 0.38
Spain 0.37 27.30 0.67 29.00 10.40 61.10 0.32 0.66 0.55 0.49 29.30 1.40 0.22
Sweden 0.64 29.70 2.25 31.30 32.00 87.20 0.72 2.64 0.99 0.66 184.80 3.80 0.74
Switzerland 0.68 48.50 2.33 31.30 22.50 78.10 0.69 2.14 0.69 0.92 411.10 3.70 0.72
UK 0.55 52.00 1.61 31.90 26.60 78.10 0.68 1.08 0.64 . 91.40 3.50 0.55  
 
Source: European Innovation Scoreboard 2008 (European Commission, 2009b) 
 
Note: the variable “human resources” is derived aggregating the variables in the first five columns, while the variable 
“knowledge” is derived aggregating the other five variables from the seventh to the eleventh column (see Table A4 for 
the description of the variables). Both the variables have been normalized between 0 and 1 (see methodological 
appendix for the normalization procedure).  
 
 
 
 
Table A4 
The correlation rates between the independent variables 
 demand drop export drop knowledge human res venture cap private cred. hi-tech man. kis service 
demand drop  1.00        
export drop 0.09 1.00       
knowledge -0.29 0.21 1.00      
human res. 0.07 0.12 0.69 1.00     
venture cap. 0.06 0.07 0.55 0.66 1.00    
private cred. -0.31 -0.58 0.28 0.38 0.53 1.00   
hi-tech man. -0.28 0.02 0.33 -0.07 -0.32 -0.29 1.00  
kis service -0.44 -0.19 0.69 0.60 0.67 0.67 0.05 1.00 
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Methodology: the two indicators 
 
 
1. The InnoInv06-08 Indicator: is based on following Innobarometer 2009 question: “Compared to 
2006, has the amount spent by your firm on all innovation activities in 2008 increased, decreased, 
or stayed approximately the same (adjust for inflation)?”.  
 
InnoInv06-08country-i = (Xcountry-i – Xcountry-min) / (Xcountry-max – X country-min)  
 
Where Xcountry-i = (% firms increasing - % firms decreasing) - see Table A1 
 
 
 
 
 
2. The InnoInv09 Indicator is based on following Innobarometer 2009 question: “In the last six 
months has your company taken one of the following actions [increased, decreased or maintain the 
innovation spending] as a direct result of the economic downturn?” 
 
 
InnoInv09country-i = (Xcountry-i – Xcountry-min) / (Xcountry-max – X country-min)  
 
Where Xcountry-i = (% firms increasing - % firms decreasing) - see Table A1 
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